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Abstract in English 
This paper analyses the impact of loan market competition on the interest rates applied by euro 
area banks to loans and deposits during the 1994-2004 period, using a novel measure of 
competition called the Boone indicator. We find evidence that stronger competition implies 
significantly lower spreads between bank and market interest rates for most loan market 
products, in line with expectations. Using an error correction model (ECM) approach to 
measure the effect of competition on the pass-through of market rates to bank interest rates, we 
likewise find that banks tend to price their loans more in accordance with the market in 
countries where competitive pressures are stronger. Further, where loan market competition is 
stronger, we observe larger bank spreads (implying lower bank interest rates) on current 
account and time deposits. This would suggest that the competitive pressure is heavier in the 
loan market than in the deposit markets, so that banks under competition compensate for their 
reduction in loan market income by lowering their deposit rates. We observe also that bank 
interest rates in more competitive markets respond more strongly to changes in market interest 
rates. These findings have important monetary policy implications, as they suggest that 
measures to enhance competition in the European banking sector will tend to render the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism more effective.  
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Abstract in Dutch 
Deze paper analyseert het effect van concurrentie op de markt voor leningen voor het 
eurogebied. Wij analyseren de periode 1994-2004. Zoals verwacht vinden we voor de meeste 
leningsproducten dat sterkere concurrentie resulteert in significant kleinere opslagen op de 
rentes van banken ten opzichte van obligatiemarktrentes. Dit vinden we ook als we een andere 
benadering kiezen: een fouten-correctiemodel (ECM). Verder vinden we dat  meer concurrentie 
op de markt van leningen leidt tot lagere rentes op deposito’s. Dit komt waarschijnlijk doordat 
banken een zekere vorm van marktmacht hebben op de depositomarkt en hierdoor lagere rentes 
aan depositohouders kunnen vragen als de opbrengsten op de markt van leningen onder druk 
staan door concurrentie. Tenslotte observeren we dat rentes van banken op leningen in meer 
competitieve markten sneller reageren op rentes in de obligatiemarkt. Deze uitkomsten 
betekenen voor het monetaire beleid dat maatregelen ter versterking van competitie in het 
Europese bankwezen het monetaire transmissiekanaal effectiever maken. 
 
Steekwoorden: Monetaire transmissie, banken, rente, competitie, panel data   4 
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Summary 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of loan market competition on euro area banks’ retail 
pricing behaviour and focus, in particular, on its effect on the adjustment of retail bank interest 
rates to changes in market interest rates. Given the prominent role of the banking sector in the 
euro area’s financial system, it is of significant importance for the ECB to monitor the degree of 
competitive behaviour in the euro area banking market. A more competitive banking market is 
expected to drive down bank loan rates, adding to the welfare of households and enterprises. In 
addition, in a more competitive market, changes in the ECB’s main policy rates supposedly will 
be more effectively passed through to bank interest rates. 
We apply a novel measure of bank competition called the Boone indicator, which is based on 
the notion that in a competitive market, more efficient companies are likely to gain market 
shares. Hence, the stronger the impact of efficiency on market shares is, the stronger is 
competition. Furthermore, by analyzing how this efficiency-market share relationship changes 
over time, this approach provides a measure which can be employed to assess how changes in 
competition affect the cost of borrowing for both households and enterprises, and how it affects 
the pass-through of policy rates into loan and deposit rates. 
We test three hypotheses concerning the impact of loan market competition on euro area banks’ 
loan and deposit rates. First, we examine the effect of loan market competition on the level on 
bank loan and deposit rates; second, using a panel error-correction model (ECM) we estimate 
the effect of loan market competition on the long-run equilibrium pass-through of bank interest 
rates to changes in corresponding market interest rates; third, we also test the impact of 
competition in the loan market on the immediate adjustment of bank interest rates to changes in 
market interest rates. 
Our results suggest that stronger competition implies significantly lower interest rate spreads for 
most loan market products, as we expected. This result implies that bank interest rates are lower 
and that the pass-through of market rates is stronger, the heavier competition is. We find 
evidence of the latter in our error correction model of bank interest rates. Furthermore, when 
loan market competition is stronger, we observe larger bank spreads (that is, lower bank interest 
rates) on current account and time deposits. Lower time deposits rates are confirmed by the 
estimates of the ECM. Apparently, the competitive pressure in the loan market is heavier than 
in the deposit markets, so that banks under competition compensate for their reduction in loan 
market income by lowering their deposit rates. Furthermore, in more competitive markets, bank 
interest rates appear to respond stronger and sometime faster to changes in market interest rates. 
These findings underline that bank competition has a substantial impact on the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. More loan market competition enhances the strength and speed of 
transmission of monetary policy.  
   8 
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1  Introduction
* 
This paper discusses the effects of bank competition on bank loan and deposit rate levels as well 
as on their responses to changes in market rates and, hence, on the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. Given the prominent role of the banking sector in the euro area’s 
financial system, it is of significant importance for the ECB to monitor the degree of 
competitive behaviour in the euro area banking market. A more competitive banking market is 
expected to drive down bank loan rates, adding to the welfare of households and enterprises. 
Further, in a more competitive market, changes in the ECB’s main policy rates supposedly will 
be more effectively passed through to bank interest rates.  
 
This study extends the existing empirical evidence, which suggests that the degree of bank 
competition may have a significant effect on both the level of bank rates and on the pass-
through of market rates to bank interest rates. Understanding this pass-through mechanism is 
crucial for central banks. However, most studies that analyse the relationship between 
competition and banks’ pricing behaviour apply a concentration index such as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) as a measure of competition. We question the suitability of such indices 
as measures to capture competition. Where the traditional interpretation is that concentration 
erodes competition, concentration and competition may instead increase simultaneously when 
competition forces consolidation. For example, in a market where inefficient firms are taken 
over by efficient companies, competition may strengthen, while the market’s concentration 
increases at the same time. In addition, the HHI suffers from a serious weakness in that it does 
not distinguish between small and large countries. In small countries, the concentration ratio is 
likely to be higher, precisely because the economy is small.  
 
The main contribution of this paper is that it applies a new measure for competition, called the 
Boone indicator (see also Boone, 2001; Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn, 2008; Van Leuvensteijn 
et al., 2007). The basic notion underlying this indicator is that in a competitive market, more 
efficient companies are likely to gain market shares. Hence, the stronger the impact of 
efficiency on market shares is, the stronger is competition. Further, by analyzing how this 
efficiency-market share relationship changes over time, this approach provides a measure which 
can be employed to assess how changes in competition affect the cost of borrowing for both 
households and enterprises, and how it affects the pass-through of policy rates into loan and 
deposit rates.  
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Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), Supervisory Policy Division, Strategy Department, P.O. Box 98, 1000 AB Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 
j.a.bikker@dnb.nl. He is also a professor of Banking and Financial Regulation at Utrecht School of Economics, University of Utrecht, 
Janskerkhof 12, NL-3511 BL Utrecht, the Netherlands. When this paper was written, A. van Rixtel was affiliated with the ECB. He is 
currently at the International Economics and International Relations Department, Banco de España (BdE), Alcalá 48, 28014 Madrid, 
Spain, adrian.van_rixtel@bde.es. The authors are grateful to A. Banarjee, F. Drudi, L. Gambacorta, R. Gropp, A. Houben, T. Werner 
and participants in an internal ECB seminar, 22 September 2006, the XV International ‘Tor Vergata’ conference on ‘Money finance 
and growth’, Rome, 10-12 December 2006, a DNB Research Seminar, 23 January 2007, and an ECB Workshop on ‘Interest rates in 
retail banking markets and monetary policy’, 5 February 2007, for valuable comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this 
paper are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the CPB, ECB, DNB or BdE.   10 
Our study contributes also to the pass-through literature in the sense that it applies a newly-
constructed data set on bank interest rates for eight euro area countries covering the January 
1994 to March 2006 period. We include data for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
1 Further, we consider four types of loan products (mortgage 
loans, consumer loans and short and long-term loans to enterprises) and two types of deposits 
(time deposits and current account deposits). We apply recently developed dynamic panel 
estimates of the pass-through model. Our approach is closely related to that of Kok Sørensen 
and Werner (2006), on which it expands by linking the degree of competition directly to the 
pass-through estimates. 
 
Against this background, we test the following three hypotheses: 
 
1.  Are loan interest rates lower, and are deposit interest rates higher, in more competitive loan 
markets than in less competitive loan markets? 
2.  Are long-run loan and deposit interest rate responses to corresponding market rates stronger in 
more competitive loan markets than in less competitive loan markets? 
3.  Do bank interest rates in more competitive markets adjust faster to changes in market interest 
rates than in less competitive markets? 
 
This paper uses interest rate data that cover a longer period and that are based on more 
harmonised principles than those used by previous pass-through studies for the euro area. We 
find that stronger competition implies significantly lower interest rate spreads for most loan 
market products, as we expected. Using an error correction model (ECM) approach to measure 
the effect of competition on the pass-through of market rates to bank interest rates, we likewise 
find that banks tend to price their loans more in accordance with the market in countries where 
competitive pressures are stronger. Furthermore, where loan market competition is stronger, we 
observe larger spreads between bank and market interest rates (that is, lower bank interest rates) 
on current account and time deposits. Lower time deposit rates in countries with stronger bank 
competition are confirmed by the ECM estimates. Apparently, the competitive pressure is 
heavier in the loan market than in the deposit markets, so that banks under competition 
compensate for their reduction in loan market income by lowering their deposit rates. 
Furthermore, in more competitive markets, bank interest rates appear to respond more strongly 
and sometime more rapidly to changes in market interest rates.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on both measuring 
competition and the bank interest rate pass-through. Section 3 describes the Boone indicator of 
competition and Section 4 the employed interest rate pass-through model of the error-correction 
 
1 For other euro area countries we had insufficient data to estimate the Boone indicator. 
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type and the applied panel unit root and cointegration tests. Section 5 presents the various data 
sets used. The results on the various tests and estimates of the spread model and the error 
correction model equations are shown in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 summarises and 
concludes.    12   13 
2  Literature review  
2.1  Measuring competition 
Competition in the banking sector has been analysed by, amongst other methods, measuring 
market power (i.e. a reduction in competitive pressure) and efficiency. A well-known approach 
to measuring market power is suggested by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982), recently used by 
Bikker (2003) and Uchida and Tsutsui (2005). They analyse bank behaviour on an aggregate 
level and estimate the average conjectural variation of banks. A strong conjectural variation 
implies that a bank is highly aware of its interdependence (via the demand equation) with other 
banks in terms of output and prices. Under perfect competition, where output price equals 
marginal costs, the conjectural variation between banks should be zero, whereas a value of one 
would indicate monopoly.  
 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) propose an approach based on the so-called H-statistic which is the 
sum of the elasticities of the reduced-form revenues with respect to the input prices. In 
principle, this H-statistic ranges from -∞ to 1. An H-value equal to or smaller than zero 
indicates monopoly or perfect collusion, whereas a value between zero and one provides 
evidence of a range of oligopolistic or monopolistic types of competition. A value of one points 
to perfect competition. This approach has been applied to all (old) EU countries by Bikker and 
Haaf (2002) and to 101 countries by Bikker et al. (2006). 
 
A third indicator for market power is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which measures the 
degree of market concentration. This indicator is often used in the context of the ‘Structure 
Conduct Performance’ (SCP) model (see e.g. Berger et al., 2004, and Bos, 2004), which 
assumes that market structure affects banks’ behaviour, which in turn determines their 
performance.
2 The idea is that banks with larger market shares may have more market power 
and use that. Moreover, a smaller number of banks make collusion more likely. To test the 
SCP-hypothesis, performance (profit) is explained by market structure, as measured by the 
HHI. Many articles test this model jointly with an alternative explanation of performance, 
namely the efficiency hypothesis, which attributes differences in performance (or profit) to 
differences in efficiency (e.g. Goldberg and Rai, 1996, and Smirlock, 1985). As has been 
mentioned above, the Boone indicator can be seen as an elaboration on the assumptions 
underlying this efficiency hypothesis (EH). This EH test is based on estimating an equation 
which explains profits from both market structure variables and measures of efficiency. The EH 
 
2 Bikker and Bos (2005), pages 22 and 23. 
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assumes that market structure variables do not contribute to profits once efficiency is 
considered as cause of profit. As Bikker and Bos (2005) show, this EH test suffers from a 
multicollinearity problem if the EH holds. 
 
Market power may also be related to profits, in the sense that extremely high profits may be 
indicative of a lack of competition. A traditional measure of profitability is the price-cost 
margin (PCM), which is the output price minus marginal costs, divided by output price. The 
PCM is frequently used in the empirical industrial organization literature as an empirical 
approximation of the theoretical Lerner index.
3 In the literature banks’ efficiency is often seen 
as proxy of competition. The existence of scale and scope economies has in the past been 
investigated thoroughly. It is often assumed that, under strong competition, unused scale 
economies would be exploited and, consequently, reduced.
4 Hence, the existence of non-
exhausted scale economies is an indication that the potential to reduce costs has not been 
exhausted and, therefore, can be seen as an indirect indicator of (imperfect) competition (Bikker 
and Van Leuvensteijn, 2008). The existence of scale efficiency is also important as regards the 
potential entry of new firms, which is a major determinant of competition. Strong scale effects 
would place new firms in an unfavourable position. 
 
A whole strand of literature is focused on X-efficiency, which reflects managerial ability to 
drive down production costs, controlled for output volumes and input price levels. X-efficiency 
of firm i is defined as the difference in cost levels between that firm and the best practice firms 
of similar size and input prices (Leibenstein, 1966). Heavy competition is expected to force 
banks to drive down their X-inefficiency, so that the latter is often used as an indirect measure 
of competition. An overview of the empirical literature is presented in Bikker (2004) and 
Bikker and Bos (2005).  
2.2  Relationship between competition and monetary transmission 
According to the seminal papers by Klein (1971) and Monti (1972) on banks’ interest rate 
setting behaviour, banks can exert a degree of market pricing power in determining loan and 
deposit rates. The Monti-Klein model demonstrates that interest rates on bank products with 
smaller demand elasticities are priced less competitively. Hence, both the levels of bank interest 
rates and their changes over time are expected to depend on the degree of competition. With 
respect to the level of bank interest rates, Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) show that 
 
3 The Lerner index derives from the monopolist's profit maximisation condition as price minus marginal cost, divided by 
price. The monopolist maximises profits when the Lerner index is equal to the inverse price elasticity of market demand. 
Under perfect competition, the Lerner index is zero (market demand is infinitely elastic), in monopoly it approaches one for 
positive non-zero marginal cost. The Lerner index can be derived for intermediary cases as well. For a discussion see 
Church and Ware (2000). 
4 This interpretation would be different in a market numbering only a few banks. It would also be different in a market where 
many new entries incur unfavourable scale effects during the initial phase of their growth path.   15 
an increase in banks’ market power (i.e. a reduction in competitive pressure) results in higher 
net interest margins.
5 In addition, Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) explain the difference between 
bank retail interest rates and money market rates by bank’s product-specific concentration 
indices. They find that in concentrated markets, retail lending rates are substantially higher, 
while deposits rates are lower. 
 
Regarding the effect of competition on the way banks adjust their lending and deposit rates, 
Hannan and Berger (1991) find that deposit rates are significantly more rigid in concentrated 
markets. Especially in periods of rising monetary policy rates, banks in more consolidated 
markets tend not to raise their deposit rates, which may be indicative of (tacit) collusive 
behaviour among banks. In a cross-country analysis, both Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) and 
Borio and Fritz (1995) find a significant effect of constrained competition on the monetary 
transmission mechanism. Thus, lending rates tend to be stickier when banks operate in a less 
competitive environment, due to, inter alia, the existence of barriers to entry. This finding was 
confirmed in an Italian setting by Cottarelli et al. (1995). Reflecting the existence of bank 
market power and collusive behaviour as well as potential switching costs for bank customers 
(or other factors affecting demand elasticities), the degree of price stickiness is likely to be 
asymmetric over the (monetary policy) interest rate cycle.
6 Against this background, Mojon 
(2001) tests for the impact of banking competition on the transmission process related to euro 
area bank lending rates, using an index of deregulation, constructed by Gual (1999). He finds 
that higher competition tends to put pressure on banks to adjust lending rates quicker when 
money market rates are decreasing. Furthermore, higher competition tends to reduce the ability 
of banks to increase lending rates (although not significantly), when money market rates are 
moving up – and vice versa for deposit rates.
7 Similar findings of asymmetric pass-through 
effects have been found by Scholnick (1996), Heinemann and Schüler (2002), Sander and 
 
5 Of course, competition is not the only factor determining the level of bank interest rates. Factors such as credit and interest 
risk, banks’ degree of risk aversion, operating costs, and bank efficiency are also likely to impact on bank margins. See, for 
example, Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004). 
6 See, for example, Neuwark and Sharpe (1992) and Mester and Saunders (1985) for empirical evidence of asymmetric 
interest rate pass-through effects among US banks.
6 In addition to bank competition, switching costs and other interest rate 
adjustment costs, bank rate rigidity may also be due to credit risk factors. For example, in a situation of credit rationing 
banks may decide to leave lending rates unchanged and to limit the supply of loans instead; see, for example, Winker 
(1999). Banks may also choose to provide their borrowers with ‘implicit interest rate insurance’ by smoothing bank loan rates 
over the cycle; see Berger and Udell (1992). Finally, sometimes banks give customers an interest rate option for a given 
period. These banks have to recoup the costs of their options which may reduce the speed of the interest rate pass-through 
for outstanding clients. 
7 In addition to bank competition, switching costs and other interest rate adjustment costs, bank rate rigidity may also be due 
to credit risk factors. For example, in a situation of credit rationing banks may decide to leave lending rates unchanged and 
to limit the supply of loans instead; see, for example, Winker (1999). Banks may also choose to provide their borrowers with 
‘implicit interest rate insurance’ by smoothing bank loan rates over the cycle; see Berger and Udell (1992). Finally, 
sometimes banks give customers an interest rate option for a given period. These banks have to recoup the costs of their 
options which may reduce the speed of the interest rate pass-through for outstanding clients. 
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Kleimeier (2002, 2004) and Gropp et al. (2007).
8 Moreover, De Bondt (2005) argues that 
stronger competition from other banks and from capital markets has helped to speed up the euro 
area banks’ interest rate adjustment’s to changes in market rates.  
 
A number of country-specific studies also provide evidence of sluggish pass-through from 
market rates into bank rates when competition is weak. For example, Heffernan (1997) finds 
that British banks’ interest rate adjustment is compatible with imperfect competition whereas 
Weth (2002), by using various proxies for bank market power, provides evidence of sluggish 
and asymmetric pass-through among German banks. De Graeve et al. (2004) estimate the 
determinants of the interest rate pass-through on Belgian banks and find that banks with more 
market power pursue a less competitive pricing policy. In a microeconomic analysis of Spanish 
banks, Lago-González and Salas-Fumás (2005) provide evidence that a mixture of price 
adjustment costs and bank market power causes price rigidity and asymmetric pass-through. In 
a cross-country study, Kok Sørensen and Werner (2006) show that differences in the pass-
through process across the euro area countries may to some extent be explained by national 
differences in bank competition. Finally, in another euro area based study, Gropp et al. (2007) 
provide evidence that the level of banking competition has a positive impact on the degree of 
bank interest rate pass-through.  
 
8 Sander and Kleimeier (2002, 2004) differ from others studies in that they also modelling asymmetries the severity of the 
interest rate shock (rather than merely its direction). This approach aims to take into account menu cost arguments implying 
that banks tend to pass on changes in market rates of a minimum size only. 
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3  The Boone indicator as measure of competition  
Boone’s indicator assumes that more efficient firms (that is, firms with lower marginal costs) 
will gain higher market shares or profits, and that this effect will be stronger the heavier 
competition in that market is. In order to support this intuitive market characteristic, Boone 
develops a broad set of theoretical models (see Boone, 2000, 2001 and 2004, Boone et al., 2004, 
and CPB, 2000). We use one of these models to explain the Boone indicator and to examine its 
properties compared to common measures such as the HHI and the PCM. Following Boone et 
al. (2004), and replacing ‘firms’ by ‘banks’, we consider a banking industry where each bank i 
produces one product qi (or portfolio of banking products), which faces a demand curve of the 
form: 
p (qi, qj≠i) = a – b qi – d ∑j≠i qj  (1) 
and has constant marginal costs mci. This bank maximizes profits πi = (pi – mci) qi by choosing 
the optimal output level qi. We assume that a > mci and 0 < d ≤ b. The first-order condition for a 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium can then be written as 
a –2 b qi – d ∑ i≠j qj – mci = 0  (2) 
Where N banks produce positive output levels, we can solve the N first-order conditions (2), 
yielding: 
qi (ci) = [(2 b/d – 1) a – (2 b/d + N – 1) mci + ∑ j mcj]/[(2 b + d (N – 1))(2 b/d – 1)]  (3) 
We define profits πi as variable profits excluding entry costs ε. Hence, a bank enters the banking 
industry if, and only if, πi ≥ ε in equilibrium. Note that Equation (3) provides a relationship 
between output and marginal costs. It follows from πi = (pi – mci) qi that profits depend on 
marginal costs in a quadratic way. Competition in this market increases as the produced 
(portfolios of) services of the various banks become closer substitutes, that is, as d increases 
(with d kept below b). Further, competition increases when entry costs ε decline. Boone et al. 
(2004) prove that market shares of more efficient banks (that is, with lower marginal costs mc) 
increase both under regimes of stronger substitution and amid lower entry costs.  
 
Equation (3) supports the use of the following model for market share, defined as si = qi / ∑ j qj: 
 
ln si = α + β ln mci  (4) 
   18 
The market shares of banks with lower marginal costs are expected to increase, so that β is 
negative. The stronger competition is, the stronger this effect will be, and the larger, in absolute 
terms, this (negative) value of β. We refer to β as the Boone indicator. For empirical reasons, 
Equation (4) has been specified in log-linear terms in order to deal with heteroskedasticty. 
Moreover, this specification implies that β is an elasticity, which facilitates interpretation, 
particularly across equations.
9 The choice of functional form is not essential, as the log-linear 
form is just an approximation of the pure linear form. 
 
The theoretical model above can also be used to explain why widely-applied measures such as 
the HHI and the PCM fail as reliable competition indicators. The standard intuition of the HHI 
is based on a Cournot model with homogenous banks, where a fall in entry barriers reduces the 
HHI. However, with banks that differ in efficiency, an increase in competition through a rise in 
d reallocates output to the more efficient banks that already had higher output levels. Hence, the 
increase in competition raises the HHI instead of lowering it. The effect of increased 
competition on the industry’s PCM may also be perverse. Generally, heavier competition 
reduces the PCM of all banks. But since more efficient banks may have a higher PCM 
(skimming off the part of profits that stems from their efficiency lead), the increase of their 
market share may raise the industry’s average PCM, contrary to common expectations. 
 
We note that the Boone indicator model, like every other model, is a simplification of reality. 
First, efficient banks may choose to translate lower costs either into higher profits or into lower 
output prices in order to gain market share. Our approach assumes that the behaviour of banks 
is between these two extreme cases, so that banks generally pass on at least part of their 
efficiency gains to their clients. More precisely, we assume that the banks’ passing-on 
behaviour, which drives Equation (4), does not diverge too strongly across the banks. Second, 
our approach ignores differences in bank product quality and design, as well as the 
attractiveness of innovations. We assume that banks are forced over time to provide quality 
levels that are more or less similar. By the same token, we presume that banks have to follow 
the innovations of their peers. Hence, like many other model-based measures, the Boone 
indicator approach focuses on one important relationship, affected by competition, thereby 
disregarding other aspects (see also Bikker and Bos, 2005). Naturally, annual estimates of β are 
more likely to be impaired by these distortions than the estimates covering the full sample 
period. Also, compared to direct measures of competition, the Boone indicator may have the 
disadvantage of being an estimate and thus surrounded by a degree of uncertainty. Of course, 
other model-based measures, such as Panzar and Rosse’s H-statistic, suffer from the same 
disadvantage. The latter shortcoming affects the annual estimates βt more strongly than the full-
sample period estimate β. 
 
9
 The few existing empirical studies based on the Boone indicator all use a log linear relationship. See, for example, Bikker 
and Van Leuvensteijn (2007).   19 
As the Boone indicator may be time dependent, reflecting changes in competition over time, we 
estimate β separately for every year (hence, βt). An absolute benchmark for the level of β is not 
available. We only know that more negative betas reflect stronger competition. Comparing the 
indicator across countries or industries helps to interpret estimation results. For that reason, 
Boone and Weigand in CPB (2000) and Boone et al. (2004) apply the model to different 
manufacturing industries. Since measurement errors – including unobserved country or industry 
specific factors – are less likely to vary over time than across industries, the time series 
interpretation of beta is probably more robust than the cross-sector one (that is, comparison of β 
for various countries or industries at a specific moment in time). Therefore, Boone focuses 
mainly on the change in βt over time within a given industry, rather than comparing β between 
industries.  
 
We improve on Boone’s approach in two ways. First, we calculate marginal costs instead of 
approximating this variable with average costs. We are able to do so by estimating a translog 
cost function, which is more precise and more closely in line with theory. An important 
advantage is that these marginal costs allow focussing on segments of the market, such as the 
loan market, where no direct observations of individual cost items are available. Second, we use 
market share as our dependent variable instead of profits. The latter is, by definition, the 
product of market shares and profit margin. We have views with respect to the impact of 
efficiency on market share and its relation with competition, supported by the theoretical 
framework above, whereas we have no a priori knowledge about the effect of efficiency on the 
profit margin. Hence, a market share model will be more precise. An even more important 
advantage of market shares is that they are always positive, whereas the range of profits (or 
losses) includes negative values. A log-linear specification would exclude negative profits 
(losses) by definition, so that the estimation results would be distorted by sample bias, because 
inefficient, loss-making banks would be ignored.  
 
In order to be able to calculate marginal costs, we estimate, for each country, a translog cost 
function (TCF) using individual bank observations. This function assumes that the technology 
of an individual bank can be described by a single one multiproduct production function. Under 
proper conditions, a dual cost function can be derived from such a production function, using 
output levels and factor prices as arguments. A TCF is a second-order Taylor expansion around 
the mean of a generic dual cost function with all variables appearing as logarithms. It is a 
flexible functional form that has proven to be an effective tool in explaining multiproduct bank 
services. Our TCF has different marginal costs for different types of banks, resulting in the 
following form: 
ln cith = α0 + ∑h=1,..,(H-1) αh dih + ∑t=1,..,(T-1) δt dt + ∑h=1,..,H ∑j=1,..,K βjh ln xijt dih 
             +∑h=1,..,H ∑j=1,..,K ∑k=1,..,K gjkh ln xijt ln xikt dih + vit  (5)   20 
where the dependent variable cit
h reflects the production costs of bank i (i = 1, .., N ) in year t (t 
= 1, .., T ). The sub-index h (h = 1, .., H ) refers to the type category of the bank (commercial, 
savings or cooperative bank). The variable di
h is a dummy variable, which is 1 if bank i is of 
type h and otherwise zero. Another dummy variable is dt,, which is 1 in year t and otherwise 
zero. The explanatory variables xikt represent three groups of variables (k = 1, .., K.). The first 
group consists of (K1) bank output components, such as loans, securities and other services 
(proxied by other income). The second group consists of (K2) input prices, such as wage rates, 
deposit rates (as price of funding) and the price of other expenses (proxied as the ratio of other 
expenses to fixed assets). The third group consists of (K-K1-K2) control variables (also called 
‘netputs’), e.g. the equity ratio. In line with Berger and Mester (1997), the equity ratio corrects 
for differences in loan portfolio risk across banks. The coefficients αh, βjh and gjkh, all vary with 
h, the bank type. The parameters δt are the coefficients of the time dummies and vit is the error 
term. 
 
Two standard properties of cost functions are linear homogeneity in the input prices and cost-
exhaustion (see e.g. Beattie and Taylor, 1985, and Jorgenson, 1986). They impose the following 
restrictions on the parameters, assuming – without loss of generality – that the indices j and k of 
the two sum terms in Equation (5) are equal to 1, 2 or 3, respectively, for wages, funding rates 
and prices of other expenses: 
b1 + b2 + b3 = 1, g1,k + g2,k + g3,k = 0 for k = 1, 2, 3, and gk,1 + gk,2 + gk,3 = 0 for k = 4,.., K  (6) 
The first restriction stems from cost exhaustion, reflecting the fact that the sum of cost shares is 
equal to unity. In other words, the value of the three inputs is equal to total costs. Linear 
homogeneity in the input prices requires that the three linear input price elasticities (bi) add up 
to 1, whereas the squared and cross terms of all explanatory variables (gi,j) add up to zero. Again 
without loss of generality, we also apply symmetry restrictions gj,k = gk,j for j, k = 1, .., K.
10 As 
Equation (5) expresses that we assume different cost functions for each type of banks, the 
restrictions (6) likewise apply to each type of bank. 
The marginal costs of output category j = l (of loans) for bank i of category h in year t, mcilt
h are 
defined as: 
mci1t
h = ¶ cit
h / ¶ xi1t = (cit
h./ xi1t) ¶ ln cit
h / ¶ ln xilt  (7) 
 
10  The  restrictions  are  imposed  on  Equation  (5),  so  that  the  equation  is  reformulated  in  terms  of  a  lower  number  of 
parameters.   21 
The term ¶ ln cit
h / ¶ ln  xilt is the first derivative of Equation (5) of costs to loans. We use the 
marginal costs of the output component ‘loans’ only (and not for the other K1 components) as 
we  investigate  the  loan  markets.  We  estimate  a  separate  translog  cost  function  for  each 
individual sector in each individual country, allowing for differences in the production structure 
across bank types within a country. This leads to the following equation of the marginal costs 
for output category loans (l ) for bank i in category h during year t:  
mci1t
h = cit
h / xi1t (β1h + 2 g1lh  ln xilt + ∑k=1,..,K; k ≠ l g1kh ln xikt ) di
h   (8)   22   23 
4  The interest rate pass-through model  
Our analysis of the pass-through of market rates to bank interest rates takes into account that 
economic variables may be non-stationary.
11 The relationship between non-stationary but 
cointegrated variables should preferably be based on an error-correction model (ECM), which 
allows disentangling the long-run co-movement of the variables from the short-run adjustment 
towards the equilibrium. Accordingly, most of the pass-through studies conducted in recent 
years apply an ECM, as it allows testing for both the long-run equilibrium pass-through of bank 
rates to changes in market rates and the speed of adjustment towards the equilibrium.
12 Using a 
panel-econometric approach, we test for the impact of banking competition (measured by the 
Boone indicator) on the long-run bank interest rate pass-through. 
4.1  Estimation of the long-run relationship 
If bank interest rates and their corresponding market rates are cointegrated, we may analyse 
their long-run relationship in an error-correction framework. Hereby, we test for the three 
hypotheses by estimating the following two equations for each of the six considered interest 
rates:
13 
t i i i t i t i t i i t i t i u D MR BI MR BI BR , , , , , , + + + + = d g b a   (9a) 
 
t i t i t i t i i t i i t i v MR BI MR u BR , , , , 1 , , + D + D + = D - j h q   (9b) 
Equation (9.a) reflects the long-run equilibrium pass-through, while Equation (9.b) presents the 
short-term adjustments of bank interest rates to their long-run equilibrium. BRi,t and MRi,t are the 
bank interest rate and the corresponding market rate, respectively, in country i (for i = 1, …, N ) 
at time t (for t = 1, …, T ), observed at a quarterly basis. BIi,t is the Boone indicator of country i 
at time t. For convenience’s sake, the Boone indicator is redefined in positive terms, so that an 
increase in the Boone indicator reflects stronger competition (hence BI = – β ). In all 
estimations, we include the market interest rates for the different countries separately (βi MRi,t 
and ηi  MRi,t, respectively, in the long and short run), in order to observe country-specific 
effects, as well as multiplied by the Boone indicator (γ BIi,t MRi,t and φ BIi, t  MRi,t, respectively, 
in the long and short run), in order to capture the (overall) impact of competition on the pass-
through. Furthermore, in the long-run model we account for country effects, by using country 
dummies (Di). The short-run model includes the error-correction term 
 
11 In order to avoid spurious results, see Granger and Newbold (1974). 
12 See, for example, Mojon (2001), De Bondt (2002, 2005), Sander and Kleimeier (2004), and Kok Sørensen and Werner 
(2006). 
13 Namely, four types of loan products (mortgage loans, consumer loans and short and long-term loans to enterprises) and 
two types of deposits (time deposits and current account deposits).   24 
(θi ui,t-1), the effects of competition on short-term adjustments in market rates (φ BIi,t ∆MRi,t) for 
all countries simultaneously and the change in the market interest rate for each country 
separately (hi ∆MRi,t).  
 
In Equations (9.a) and (9.b), we estimate European-wide (or panel) parameters for the various 
competition effects (α, γ and φ), because the Boone indicator varies insufficiently over time to 
estimate reliable country-specific effects. The other parameters (βi, ηi and θi) remain country-
specific, unless restrictions that these parameters are equal across all countries considered 
would be accepted by a Wald test. 
 
The three hypotheses to be tested are: 
 
1.  Are loan interest rates lower, and are deposit interest rates higher, in more competitive loan 
markets than in less competitive loan markets? H0: α + γ MRi,t < 0 and  
H1: α + γ MRi,t ≥ 0;
14 (and H0: α +  γ MRi,t > 0 and H1: α +  γ MRi,t ≤ 0, respectively, for deposit 
rates).  
2.  Are long-run loan and deposit interest rates responses to the corresponding market rates 
stronger in more competitive loan markets than in less competitive loan markets?H0: γ > 0 and 
H1: γ  ≤  0. 
3.  Do more competitive markets adjust faster, in the short run, to changes in market interest rates 
than in less competitive markets? H0: φ > 0 and H1: φ ≤  0. 
 
As we measure competition on the loan market, the competition effects on the deposit-rate pass-
through may be less reliable. Loan market competition might have a positive impact on deposit 
markets also, implying α1 + γ1 MRi,t > 0. Alternatively, banks may try to compensate for strong 
loan market competition by exploiting their market power in the deposit market, in which case 
α1 + γ1 MRi,t <0. 
4.2  Unit root and panel cointegration tests 
Unit root tests 
As a first preparatory step, we investigate the unit root properties of the variables.
15 We apply 
two types of tests based on two different null hypotheses. The Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test 
(henceforth the IPS test) is a panel version of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test on unit 
roots. It is based on the following regression equation: 
 
14 Note that competition causes a downwards shift to the level of bank interest rates (that is, α1 < 0) as well as a change in 
the relationship between market rates and bank rates (expressed by γ1 MRi,t). 
15 For a survey of panel unit root tests, see Banerjee (1999). For a more detailed description and application to a similar set 
of data, see also Kok-Sørensen and Werner (2006).   25 
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-   (10) 
The interest rate series under investigation is yi,t and it must be observable for each country i 
and each month t. The autoregressive parameter ρi is estimated for each country separately, 
which allows for a large degree of heterogeneity. The null hypothesis is, H0: ρi = 0 for all i, 
against the alternative hypothesis H1: ρi > 0 for some countries. The test statistic Zt_bar of the IPS 
test is constructed by cross-section-averaging the individual t-statistics for ρi. Rejection of the 
null hypothesis indicates stationarity.  
 
As a cross-check, we add results based on Hadri’s (2000) test, which is a panel version of the 
Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) test, testing the null hypothesis of 
stationarity. The model underlying the Hadri test can be written as: 
t i
t
i i t i u y ,
1
, , e a
t
t + ∑ + =
=
  (11) 
The time series yi,t are broken down into two components, a random walk component Στ ui,τ and 
a stationary component εi,t. The test statistic Zτ:is based on the ratio of the variances σ
2
u / σ
2
ε. The 
null hypothesis of the test assumes that this ratio is zero, which implies that there is no random 
walk component. Rejection of this test’s null hypothesis indicates the presence of unit root 
behaviour of the variable under investigation. Both panel series test statistics are asymptotically 
normal.  
Cointegration tests 
In a second preliminary step, we test for cointegration using panel cointegration tests by 
Pedroni (1999, 2004) which are based on the following regression models: 
t i
K
j t i j i j i t i x y , 1 , , , , e b a + ∑ + = =   (12) 
The long-run coefficients βi,j may be different across the euro area countries. We use the group 
mean panel version of the Pedroni test. The null hypothesis of this test assumes a unit root in 
the residuals of the cointegration regression, which implies absence of cointegration. The 
alternative hypothesis assumes a root less than one, but allows for different roots in different 
countries.
16 We use three different types of test statistics: an ADF type which is similar to the 
 
16 In the panel versions of the tests the alternative hypothesis assumes a root which is less than one but is identical between 
the countries. Hence, the group mean versions allow for stronger heterogeneity. As a result, we focus on the test’s group 
mean version.   26 
ADF statistic used in univariate unit-root tests, a nonparametric Phillips-Perron (PP) version, 
and a version which is based directly on the autoregressive coefficient (ρ-test).   27 
5  The Data 
5.1  The Boone indicator 
This paper uses the Bankscope database of banks from eight euro area countries during 1992-
2004, namely Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
Our choice of countries was limited by the availability of (usable) data. For countries such as 
Finland, Greece and Ireland not enough data are available. Luxembourg is excluded from our 
sample because its figures presumably do not reflect local market conditions due to the high 
international profile of its banks. We focus on commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative 
banks and mortgage banks, ignoring the 25% more specialized institutions such as investment 
banks, securities firms, long-term credit banks and specialized governmental credit institutions. 
An exception is made for Germany in order to achieve a more adequate coverage of the national 
banking systems: specialized German governmental credit institutions, comprising mainly the 
major Landesbanken, are included. In addition to certain public finance duties, the 
Landesbanken also offer banking activities in competition with private sector banks, and thus 
should be included to ensure adequate cover of the competitive environment in the German 
banking system (see Hackethal, 2004). The appendix provides a detailed description of the data; 
see also Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007). Table 5.1 presents summary statistics of the estimated 
Boone indicator.
17 Over the 1994-2004 period we observe that, on average, banking 
competition is heaviest in Spain, Germany and Italy. Competition appears to be less strong in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria, and is found to be weakest in France and Portugal. At 
the same time, Boone indicators for many countries vary considerably over time.
18 
Table 5.1  Summary statistics of the Boone indicator (1994-2004) 
  AT  BE  DE  ES  FR  IT  NL  PT 
                 
Average  - 1.5  - 2.6  - 4.0  - 4.8  - 0.6  - 4.0  - 2.5  - 0.9 
Standard 
deviation 
2.3  0.7  1.5  1.8  0.5  1.8  1.5  1.2 
Maximum  4.3  - 1.5  - 2.5  - 2.7  0.3  - 1.6  1.0  1.6 
Minimum  - 4.0  - 3.4  - 7.1  - 9.6  - 1.3  - 7.3  - 4.4  - 2.4 
 
 
17 The Boone indicator results in this paper may seem different from those in Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007). However, both 
working papers use identical estimates of the Boone indicator. The estimates in the appendix of the present paper are 
exactly equal to the estimates in Table 5.4 in Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007). However, the presentation of the results differs 
in two respects from Table 5.3 in Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007). First, in this paper we present three additional euro-area 
countries, namely Austria, Belgium and Portugal. Second, in Table 5.3 in Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) we compare the 
average Boone indicator across the European countries by estimating a single parameter for each country over the entire 
sample period. In this way, we obtain a weighted average of the Boone indicator over the entire period instead of an 
unweighted average of the annually (time dependent) estimates as in Table 5.1. See the appendix for the yearly estimates 
of the Boone indicator. 
18 For more details, see Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007).   28 
5.2  Bank interest rates and market rates 
Our bank loan interest rates are from the ECB’s MFI Interest Rate (MIR) statistics, which since 
January 2003 have been compiled on a harmonised basis across all euro area countries. Prior to 
January 2003 the series have been extended backwards to January 1994 using the non-
harmonised national retail interest rate (NRIR) statistics compiled by the national central banks 
of the (later) Eurosystem.
19 The MIR statistics consist of more detailed breakdowns than the 
NRIR statistics, particularly with respect to the size of loans and the rate fixation periods. In 
order to link the two sets of statistics, the MIR series have been aggregated (using new business 
volumes as weights) to the broader product categories of the NRIR statistics, which include 
rates on mortgage loans, rates on consumer loans, rates on short-term loans to non-financial 
corporations (≤1 year), rates on long-term loans to non-financial corporations (>1 year), rates 
on current account deposits and rates on time deposits. The data period covers 147 monthly 
observations ranging from January 1994 to March 2006.  
Table 5.2   Availability of bank interest rates and corresponding market rates 
 
 
Mortgage loans  Consumer 
loans 
Short-term 
enterprise loans 
Long-term 
enterprise loans 
Current account 
deposits 
Time 
deposits 
             
AT  April 1995 
3M MR 
April 1995 
3M MR 
April 1995 
3M MR 
 
April 1995 
3M MR 
April 1995 
3M MR 
BE  Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
5Y MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
5Y MR 
 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
DE  Jan. 1994 
10Y MR 
Jan. 1994 
5Y MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Nov. 1996 
5Y MR 
 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
ES  Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
FR  Jan. 1994 
10Y MR 
Jan. 1994 
5Y MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
5Y MR 
 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
IT  Jan. 1995 
3M MR 
 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1995 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Feb. 1995 
3M MR 
NL  Jan. 1994 
10Y MR 
 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
PT  Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
   
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
             
Sources: ECB and Bloomberg. 
Note: Date indicates: ‘available since’; ‘3M MR’ is the 3-month money market rate (MR). ‘5Y MR’ is the 5-year government bond yield. 
‘10Y MR’ is the 10-year government bond yield, all for the respective country. 
 
We select market rates which correspond to these bank interest rates in terms of the rate fixation 
period. Hence, a three-month money market rate is selected to correspond with bank rates that 
are either floating or fixed for short periods (below one year), while longer-term government 
 
19 For some bank products in some countries, it is not possible (due to insufficient data being available) to extend interest 
rates series all the way back to 1994. Hence, we use unbalanced samples for some bank products.   29 
bond yields are selected for long-term fixed bank rates.
20 Table 5.2 presents the data availability 
of bank interest rates in each country and for each product category together with the 
corresponding market rates. Note that there is strong variation in interest rate fixation periods 
across both products and countries. For instance, in many of the considered euro area countries 
the predominant fixation period for mortgages is rather short, proxied by three months. For 
Germany and France, however, the typical fixation period on consumer loans is quite long, 
approximated here by five years. 
Table 5.3  Summary statistics of the various bank interest rates (1994-2004; in %) 
   AT  BE  DE  ES  FR  IT  NL  PT 
                  Mortgage rates           
                 
Average  5.6  5.9  6.4  6.6  6.1  7.0  5.7  7.6 
Standard deviation  1.0  1.2  1.1  2.7  1.5  3.2  1.0  3.5 
Maximum  7.9  8.8  9.1  11.5  8.9  13.0  8.0  14.5 
Minimum  3.8  3.8  4.5  3.1  3.9  3.7  3.8  3.4 
           
                   Consumer lending rates         
                 
Average  6.6  8.1  7.5  10.4  8.8      13.1 
Standard deviation  1.1  0.5  1.0  2.8  1.7      3.6 
Maximum  9.5  9.1  10.2  16.2  12.1      19.6 
Minimum  5.0  7.3  6.3  7.1  6.2      8.6 
       
                   Rates on short-term loans to enterprises     
                 
Average  4.8  4.6  4.0  5.9  4.5  6.7  4.2  8.8 
Standard deviation  1.0  1.1  0.7  2.2  1.5  2.8  1.0  3.8 
Maximum  7.2  7.6  5.8  10.5  7.8  11.7  6.5  16.8 
Minimum  2.9  2.9  3.1  3.2  2.6  3.3  2.8  4.4 
       
                   Rates on long-term loans to enterprises     
                 
Average    5.1  5.2  5.7  5.9  6.3     
Standard deviation    1.1  0.5  2.4  1.4  2.7     
Maximum    8.2  6.1  10.4  8.8  11.8     
Minimum    3.4  4.2  3.0  4.0  3.1     
           
                  Current account deposit rates         
                 
Average  1.3      1.8     2.6  1.7   
Standard deviation  0.2      1.2     1.8  0.3   
Maximum  1.7      4.6     5.7  2.0   
Minimum  1.0      0.5     0.7  1.1   
             
                  Time deposit rates           
                 
Average  3.5  3.4  4.4  3.8  4.0  3.3  4.1  3.4 
Standard deviation  1.0  0.9  2.1  1.3  2.3  0.9  2.2  0.8 
Maximum  6.3  5.4  8.9  8.0  9.1  5.4  8.7  5.1 
Minimum  1.9  2.0  1.9  2.0  1.6  2.0  1.8  2.0 
 
20 The market rates have been chosen to best match bank interest rates on the basis of information from the Methodological 
Notes for the NRIR statistics and from the volume weights of the MIR statistics.   30 
Table 5.3 shows summary statistics of the bank interest rate data. Bank interest rates differ 
substantially across countries, across products and over time. On average, over the 1994-2004 
period, mortgage rates and consumer lending rates were highest (lowest) in Portugal (Austria). 
Regarding short-term loans to enterprises rates were on average highest (lowest) in Portugal 
(Germany), whereas regarding long-term loans to enterprises rates were highest (lowest) in Italy 
(Belgium). On the deposit side, current account deposit rates were lowest (highest) in Austria 
(Italy), while time deposit rates were lowest (highest) in Italy (Germany). Regarding 
developments over time, it may be noted that the variation of bank interest rates was highest in 
the Mediterranean countries reflecting the particular strong decline in the overall level of 
interest rates in those countries.  
 
Table 5.4 details the market interest rates for the considered countries. We find that Italy has, on 
average, the highest three-month money market rate and the Netherlands the lowest. The same 
picture arises for the 5-year government bond yield. The minima for the three-month money 
market rates and the two government bond yields with, respectively, a 5 and 10 year fixation 
period are very similar across all countries: these minima where reached after the introduction 
of the euro in 1999. 
Table 5.4  Summary statistics of the various market rates (1994-2004; in %) 
   AT  BE  DE  ES  FR  IT  NL  PT 
         
               3-month money market rate       
                 
Average  3.6  3.6  3.6  4.9  3.9  5.4  3.5  5.3 
Standard deviation  0.9  1.1  1.0  2.3  1.4  2.8  1.0  2.9 
Maximum  5.5  7.0  5.9  9.7  8.1  11.0  5.4  12.7 
Minimum  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0 
   
                5-year government bond yield 
                 
Average  4.7  4.8  4.5  5.7  4.8  6.1  4.6  5.9 
Standard deviation  1.1  1.2  1.0  2.6  1.3  2.9  1.1  2.7 
Maximum  7.3  8.0  7.1  12.2  7.9  13.4  7.3  12.2 
Minimum  2.8  2.9  2.8  2.7  2.7  2.9  2.8  2.7 
   
              10-year government bond yield 
                 
Average      5.2    5.4    5.3   
Standard deviation      1.0    1.2    1.0   
Maximum      7.6    8.2    7.7   
Minimum      3.6    3.6    3.6   
 
Table 5.5 presents the spreads between the various bank and market rates. We present the 
spreads on deposits as a negative number as the market interest rates are higher than the bank 
lending rates on these products. On average, the spreads are narrow ranging from 0.5% to 2.0%,   31 
with the notable exception of consumer loans where bank interest rates often include very high 
risk premiums. 
Table 5.5  Summary statistics of the various bank-rate spreads (1994-2004; in %) 
   AT  BE  DE  ES  FR  IT  NL  PT 
             
                  Mortgage rates           
                 
Average  2.1  2.2  1.8  1.6  1.3  1.9  1.1  2.2 
Standard deviation  0.6  0.6  0.3  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.2  1.0 
Maximum  3.6  3.5  2.4  2.9  3.8  3.7  1.7  4.5 
Minimum  0.8  0.3  1.0  0.8  0.1  0.7  0.6  0.5 
           
                   Consumer lending rates         
                 
Average  3.2  4.2  3.1  5.5  4.0      7.7 
Standard deviation  0.7  0.9  0.8  0.6  0.9      1.3 
Maximum  5.1  6.5  5.2  7.2  7.0      10.2 
Minimum  2.1  2.6  1.4  4.2  2.3      4.4 
       
                   Rates on short-term loans to enterprises     
                 
Average  1.3  1.0  0.5  1.0  0.6  1.3  0.7  3.4 
Standard deviation  0.6  0.2  0.6  0.2  0.8  0.5  0.3  1.1 
Maximum  2.9  1.5  1.6  2.0  2.8  2.5  1.3  6.7 
Minimum  0.4  0.4  - 0.4  0.5  -1.8  - 0.4  - 0.1  1.9 
       
                   Rates on long-term loans to enterprises     
                 
Average    0.4  1.1  0.9  1.1  1.3     
Standard deviation    0.4  0.2  0.4  0.7  0.4     
Maximum    1.2  1.8  1.8  2.2  3.3     
Minimum    - 0.3  0.5  0.1  - 0.4  - 0.5     
           
                  Current account deposit rates         
                 
Average  - 2.0      - 2.9     - 2.7  - 1.7   
Standard deviation  0.7      1.2     1.1  0.8   
Maximum  - 1.0      - 1.4     - 1.3  - 0.8   
Minimum  - 3.8      - 5.9     - 6.0  - 3.5   
                 
  Time deposit rates         
                 
Average  - 0.4  - 0.1  - 0.2  - 0.5  - 0.1  - 0.9  - 0.2  - 1.1 
Standard deviation  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.5  0.4  0.9 
Maximum  0.6  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2  - 0.2  0.6  - 0.1 
Minimum  - 1.5  - 0.7  - 0.6  - 1.1  - 0.3  - 2.6  - 1.1  - 4.7 
   32   33 
6  Empirical results  
Estimates of the Boone indicator for the loan markets in the euro area countries are presented in 
the appendix. This approach is similar to the procedure applied in Van Leuvensteijn et al. 
(2007). We obtain annual estimates of the Boone indicator. As the regressions in this section are 
based on monthly data, we calculate ‘smoothed’ Boone indicator values using moving averages 
over six months. 
6.1  Unit roots and cointegration 
Table 6.1 reports the panel unit root tests for the bank and market interest rate series of the 
considered eight euro area countries simultaneously. The outcomes indicate non-stationarity at 
the 5% significance level for all the bank and market interest rate series used. The IPS test on 
the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level for either the 
bank rates or the market rates, suggesting non-stationary interest rates. While the IPS test 
indicates stationarity of the Boone indicator, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be 
rejected at the 5% significance level for the product of the Boone indicator and the market rates 
for three of the six categories, namely mortgage loans, consumer loans and time deposits. 
However, the Hadri-test on the null hypothesis of stationarity is clearly rejected in all cases. 
Furthermore, we apply the panel unit root tests for the first differences in interest rates to test on 
second order non-stationarity. The results reject I(2) and, hence, support the conclusion that the 
interest rate series are integrated of order 1, so that I(1) holds. Given these findings, we proceed 
to test on cointegration between bank interest rates and the corresponding market rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   34 
Table 6.1  Panel unit root tests on model variables applied to all countries  
                                Im, Pesaran and Shin test  Hadri test 
         
  Zt_bar
a
  p-value  Zτ  p-value 
       
       
Boone-indicator  - 2.16  0.02  10.67  0.00 
       
                           Bank interest rates       
         
Mortgage loans  0.98  0.84  18.78  0.00 
Consumer loans  - 0.89  0.19  16.59  0.00 
Short-term loans to enterprises  - 0.68  0.25  18.83  0.00 
Long-term loans to enterprises  0.40  0.66  13.10  0.00 
Current account deposits  1.64  0.95  13.86  0.00 
Time deposits  - 0.72  0.24  16.03  0.00 
       
                                    Market interest rates 
b      
         
Mortgage loans  0.04  0.52  17.08  0.00 
Consumer loans  0.34  0.64  15.21  0.00 
Short-term loans to enterprises  - 0.68  0.25  17.23  0.00 
Long-term loans to enterprises  0.94  0.83  13.39  0.00 
Current account deposits  0.38  0.65  12.60  0.00 
Time deposits  - 1.56  0.06  16.46  0.00 
   
                                    Boone indicator times market interest rates
 a 
         
Mortgage loans  - 2.16  0.01  15.76  0.00 
Consumer loans  - 1.88  0.03  12.64  0.00 
Short-term loans to enterprises  - 1.44  0.08  17.46  0.00 
Long-term loans to enterprises  - 1.38  0.08  13.74  0.00 
Current account deposits  - 1.60  0.06  12.65  0.00 
Time deposits  - 2.46  0.01  15.70  0.00 
         
a The test statistics are explained in Section 4.2. 
b Market rates are approximated according to Table 5.2. 
 
Table 6.2 shows the results for Pedroni’s three panel cointegration tests as applied to the long-
run models of the six bank rates.
21 For bank interest rates on consumer loans and current 
account deposits, the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected. Apparently, 
therefore, the adjustment of interest rates on consumer loans and current account deposits to 
changes in market rates is so sluggish that even a long-run relationship cannot be detected in 
our sample.
22 Consequently, the results of the error-correction model on consumer loans and 
current account deposits, presented in Section 6.2 below, have to be interpreted with caution. 
For the other four long-run bank rate models, the null hypothesis of no cointegration has been 
 
21 P-values of the various test statistics have been derived using the standard normal distribution, which is a valid 
assumption for cointegration tests; see Pedroni (1999). 
22 Data on interest rates on consumer loans and current account deposits prior to January 2003 are only available for six 
and four countries, respectively, which somewhat limits the analysis of these rates.    35 
rejected (for two of the three tests), indicating a long-run equilibrium relationship between bank 
rates, market rates and the Boone indicator. 
Table 6.2  Pedroni cointegration tests on the six long-run bank interest rates models 
Bank interest rates                        Group mean panel cointegration tests 
a 
       
  P-statistic  PP-statistic  ADF-statistic 
       
Mortgage loans  - 3.19 (0.00)  - 3.56 (0.00)  - 0.07 (0.53) 
Consumers loans  0.73 (0.77)  0.19 (0.57)  0.05 (0.52) 
Short term loans to enterprises  - 5.79 (0.00)  - 4.75 (0.00)  - 1.50 (0.07) 
Long term loans to enterprises  - 2.68 (0.00)  - 2.91 (0.00)  - 0.75 (0.22) 
Current account deposits  1.14 (0.87)  1.29 (0.90)  0.66 (0.75) 
Time deposits  - 8.28 (0.00)  - 7.08 (0.00)  - 0.43 (0.33) 
        a P-values in parentheses.       
 
6.2  Competition and the bank interest-rate pass-through  
As a first investigation into the impact of competition on the bank interest rate pass-through, we 
analyse the effect of competition on the various spreads between bank and market interest rates 
(see Table 6.3). The main finding is that competition tends to keep bank loan rates more closely 
in line with the corresponding market rates (implying that they are lower). Moreover, the results 
in Table 6.3 show that competition significantly diminishes the bank rate spreads for three out 
of four loan products, namely for mortgages, consumer loans and short-term loans to 
enterprises. No significant effect is found for long-term loans to enterprises. The Boone 
indicator’s elasticities of the first three loan products indicate that mortgage loans are least 
affected by competition while short-term loans to enterprises are influenced most strongly.  
 
For the two deposit categories, competition in the loan market seems to increase the (negative) 
spread between bank and market rates. Hence, deposit rates become lower where there is fierce 
competition in the loan market. This could reflect that the competitive pressure is heavier in the 
loan market than in the deposit markets, so that banks under competitive pressure compensate 
for their decline in loan market income by lowering their deposit rates.   36 
Table 6.3  Effect of competition on the spreads between bank and market lending rates  
    Mortgage loans          Consumer loans      Short term loans to 
         enterprises 
                 
      Parameter  Z-value
1)  Parameter  Z-value  Parameter  Z-value 
   
   
   
 
Boone indicator   - 0.030  - 2.12**  - 0.075  - 3.03***  - 0.128  - -6.72*** 
Constant  1.357  5.54***  5.818  16.91***  .736  3.02*** 
Country dummies 
2)  χ
2(7)=498 
  χ
2(5)=3095 
  χ
2(7)=911 
 
Monthly dummies
2)  χ
2(119)=693 
  χ
2(119)=766 
  χ
2(119)=223 
 
R-squared, centred  0.687    0.907    0.793   
Number of observations  957    717    957   
           
     
Long term loans to 
       enterprises 
       Current account (sight) 
        deposits 
        Time deposits 
                 
      Parameter  Z-value  Parameter  Z-value  Parameter  Z-value 
       
   
 
Boone indicator   0.003  0.15  - 0.154  - 8.26***  - 0.036  - 3.06*** 
Constant  1.114  4.26***  - 3.496  - 12.30***  - 0.655  - 2.80*** 
Country dummies   χ
2(4)=240 
  χ
2(3)=141 
  χ
2(7)=640 
 
Monthly dummies  χ
2(119)=1084 
  χ
2(119)=1499 
  χ
2(119)=389 
 
R-squared, centred  0.670    0.832    0.691   
Number of observations  578    477    956   
 
Two and three asterisks indicate a level of confidence of 95% and 99%, respectively. 
1) The z-
value indicates whether the parameter significantly differs from 0 under the normal distribution 
with mean zero and standard deviation one. 
2) Chi-squared distributed Wald tests on H0 ‘all 
country dummy coefficients are zero’ and ‘all monthly time dummy coefficients are zero’, 
respectively. The null hypotheses are rejected for all loan and deposit types. 
 
Table 6.4 presents the estimated long-run relationship of the error-correction model (ECM) 
described in Section 4.1 (Equation (9.a)), in order to test the three hypotheses mentioned in that 
section. This model explains bank interest rates from the Boone indicator and the market 
interest rates. We use Newey-West’s kernel-based heteroskedastic and autocorrelation 
consistent (HAC) variance estimations to correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, 
where the bandwidth has been set on two periods. We observe that the impact of market rates 
on bank interest rates is highly significant for all six interest rates considered and in all eight 
euro area countries. Moreover, in line with the existing literature, we find that the country-
specific long-run pass-through coefficients (βi) differ considerably across product categories 
(and across countries) for both the long and short term. The adjustment of bank interest rates to 
changes in market rates is highest for mortgage loans, loans to enterprises and time deposits.
23 
 
The first hypothesis is: are loan interest rates lower, and are deposit interest rates higher, in 
more competitive loan markets than in less competitive loan markets? Contrary to the 
 
23 See also Mojon (2001), De Bondt (2005) and Kok Sørensen and Werner (2006).   37 
estimations of the spreads presented above, the ECM long-run equation does not assume full 
pass-through of market rates within one month. Table 6.4 shows that the effect of the 
interaction terms with the Boone indicator of competition and the market rate is (slightly) 
positive for all four considered loan products.
24 But the Chi-squared distributed Wald tests on 
H0: α +γ MRi,t = 0 also shows that the combined effects of α + γ MRi,t on bank rates are not 
significant. This outcome does not confirm our earlier finding of significantly lower loan 
market spreads under competition. Apparently, the simple spread model is a more successful 
tool to observe the competition effect than the more complicated ECM.
25 
 
The second hypothesis is: do bank interest rates in more competitive markets show stronger 
long-run responses to the corresponding market rates compared to less competitive markets? 
Our results suggest that all four bank loan rates do indeed respond significantly more strongly 
to market rates when competition is high, as reflected by the significant positive coefficient γ of 
the product terms of indicator and market rates for all loan categories. We find that competition 
in the loan market contributes also to a more complete pass-through of interest rates on current 
accounts.
26 All in all, we observe that, generally, competition does make for stronger long-run 
bank rate responses to corresponding market rates. 
 
The third hypothesis is: do more competitive markets adjust faster in the short run to changes in 
market interest rates than in less competitive markets? To test this hypothesis, we estimate 
Equation (9.b). The results in Table 6.5 indicate that the immediate responses of banks’ interest 
rates on loans to changes in market rates tend indeed to be higher in more competitive markets 
(see the coefficient φ of the product terms).
27 However, the effect is not statistically significant. 
All in all, we find only limited evidence to support the third hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 When tested, one single EU-wide parameter for market interest rates was rejected in favour of separate country-specific 
parameters for market interest rates.  
25 We have tested on a single EU-wide parameter for market interest rates in the long-run ECM model. This null hypothesis 
was rejected for all loan and deposit categories in favour of separate country-specific parameters for market interest rates.  
26 As mentioned in Section 4, the estimated long-run relationship between interest rates on consumer loans and current 
account deposits and corresponding market rates may be spurious owing to the lack of a statistically significant cointegration 
relationship. 
27 We have tested on one single EU-wide parameter for market interest rates and for one single EU-wide parameter for 
residuals in the short-run ECM model. The null hypotheses of a single  EU-wide parameter were rejected for most loan and 
deposit categories in favour of separate country-specific parameters.   38 
Table 6.4  Estimates of the long-run ECM models for the six bank interest rates  
    Mortgage loans       Consumer loans     Short-term loans to 
        enterprises 
             
  Parameter  Z-value  Parameter  Z-value  Parameter  Z-value 
   
   
   
 
Boone indicator (α)  - 0.198  - 3.32***  - 0.196  - 2.39**  - 0.153  - 3.39** 
Market interest rate AT  0.843  8.02***  0.824  6.15***  0.937 
***8.76*** 
Market interest rate BE  0.913  2.26***  1.000  5.98***  0.892  23.05*** 
Market interest rate DE  0.923  14.88***  0.312  2.41**  0.325  6.22*** 
Market interest rate ES  0.777  10.89***  0.785  7.63***  0.725  10.90*** 
Market interest rate FR  0.989  12.85***  1.093  13.38***  0.877  13.04*** 
Market interest rate IT  0.870  16.07***      0.807  16.90*** 
Market interest rate NL  0.784  18.11***      0.879  20.11***  
Market interest rate PT  1.274  24.63***  1.336  23.06***  1.344  37.41*** 
Market interest rate*Boone ind. (γ)  0.053  4.29***  0.057  3.21***  0.039  3.47*** 
Constant  1.951  9.74***  5.679  11.21**  2.813  13.62*** 
R-squared, centred  0.940    0.927    0.952   
Number of observations  957    717    957   
α +  γ MRi,t      0.034    0.055    0.002   
χ
2  H0: α +  γ MRi,t = 0 
1)  2.92, p-value = 0.09  2.39, p-value =0.12  0.01, p-value = 0.92 
           
     
       Long term loans to 
          enterprises 
Current account (sight) 
deposits 
        Time deposits 
                 
      Parameter  Z-value  Parameter  Z-value  Parameter  Z-value 
   
   
     
Boone indicator (α)  - 0.181  - 3.59***  - 0.146  - 5.75***  - .001  - 0.60 
Market interest rateAT      0.063  2.28***  0.616  10.17*** 
Market interest rate BE  0.808  16.79***      0.921  39.45*** 
Market interest rate DE  0.615  11.48***      0.894  33.03*** 
Market interest rate ES  0.691  10.89***  0.259  6.75***  0.925  26.99*** 
Market interest rate FR  0.982  14.42***      0.997  137.37*** 
Market interest rate IT  0.745  18.84***  0.433  18.09***  0.856 
*26.99*** 
Market interest rate NL      0.083  2.19***  0.831  12.41*** 
Market interest rate PT          0.798  38.33*** 
Market interest rate*Boone-ind. (γ)  0.046  4.48***  0.037  5.86***  - 0.015  - 0.60 
Constant  2.591  11.58***  1.457  10.43***  0.302  3.15** 
R-squared, centred  0.956    0.966    0.972   
Number of observations  578    477    956   
α +  γ MRi,t  0.028    0.005    - 0.024   
χ2  H0: α + γ MRi,t = 0 
1)  2.26, p-value=0.13  0.53, p-value=0.47  4.29, p-value =0.04 
       
Note: One, two and three asterisks indicate levels of confidence of 90%, 95% and 99%, respectively. Country dummies are included but 
not shown. 1)Chi-squared distributed Wald tests on H0 ‘α + γ MRi,t = 0’. The null hypothesis is not rejected for any of the loan and for 
current account deposits. 
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Table 6.5  The short-term ECM model of bank interest rates  
       Mortgage loans  Consumer loans    Short term loans to 
     enterprises 
                 
      Parameter  Z-value  Parameter  Z-value  Parameter  Z-value 
   
   
   
 
∆Market interest rate AT  0.2272  3.15***  0.203  1.84*  0.275  3.41*** 
∆Market interest rate BE  0.207  1.73*  0.358  1.32  0.408  2.49*** 
∆Market interest rate DE  0.511  4.33***  - 0.267  - 1.30  0.159  1.20 
∆Market interest rate ES  0.217  1.75*  0.041  0.10  0.573  3.36*** 
∆Market interest rate FR  - 0.025  - 0.58  - 0.005  - 0.09  0.079  0.73 
∆Market interest rate IT  0.156  1.11      0.066  0.42 
∆Market interest rate NL  0.262  2.79***      0.464  3.01*** 
∆Market interest rate PT  0.173  1.88*  0.001  0.00  0.159  0.87 
∆Market interest rate*Boone-ind. (φ)  0.020  0.86  0.071  1.52  0.050  1.66* 
Residual AT (-1)
 a  - 0.005  - 3.10***  - 0.004  - 2.89***  - 0.005 
***-
3.00*** 
Residual BE (-1)  - 0.007  - 2.20**  - 0.003  - 1.09  - 0.005  - 1.52 
Residual DE (-1)  - 0.003  - 1.56  - 0.003  - 2.07**  - 0.001  - 0.23 
Residual ES (-1)  - 0.006  - 2.80***  - 0.003  - 0.86  - 0.000  - 0.03 
Residual FR (-1)  - 0.006  - 3.45***  - 0.004  - 3.25***  - 0.003  - 0.44 
Residual IT (-1)  - 0.006  - 1.96**      - 0.004  - 1.64* 
Residual NL (-1)  - 0.004  - 1.63      - 0.000  - 0.10 
Residual PT (-1)  - 0.009  - 3.89***  - 0.006  - 1.50  - 0.011  - 2.28** 
R-sq centred   0.19    0.03    0.19   
Number of observations  949    711    949   
           
     
     Long term loans to 
       enterprises 
Current account (sight) 
deposits 
     Time deposits 
                 
      Parameter  Z-value  Parameter  Z-value  Parameter  Z-value 
       
   
 
∆Market interest rate AT      0.107  3.05***  0.229  2.90*** 
∆Market interest rate BE  0.987  6.97***      0.532  6.02*** 
∆Market interest rate DE  0.657  3.56***      0.587  6.27*** 
∆Market interest rate ES  0.994  3.67***  0.374  3.90***  0.344  2.09** 
∆Market interest rate FR  0.162  1.47      0.972  38.82*** 
∆Market interest rate IT  0.744  3.34***  0.312  3.68***  0.146  1.28 
∆Market interest rate NL      0.099  2.45**  0.463  4.95*** 
∆Market interest rate PT          0.281  3.37*** 
∆Market interest rate*Boone-ind. (φ)  0.070  1.41  - 0.033  -2.47**  0.020  0.92 
Residual AT (-1)      - 0.004  -2.16**  - 0.004  - 1.69* 
Residual BE (-1  0.001  0.31      - 0.004  - 1.58 
Residual DE (-1)  - 0.001  - 0.80      - 0.001  - 0.64 
Residual ES (-1)  - 0.005  - 1.51  - 0.010  -2.13**  - 0.006  - 2.03** 
Residual FR (-1)  - 0.004  - 1.36      0.000  0.24 
Residual IT (-1)  - 0.004  - 1.33  - 0.007  -1.41  - 0.009  - 2.33** 
Residual NL (-1)      - 0.003  -2.18**  - 0.005  - 1.46 
Residual PT (-1) 
        - 0.009 
***-
3.39*** 
R-squared centred  0.27    0.18    0.63   
Number of observations  573    473    948   
             
Note: One, two and three asterisks indicate a level of confidence of, respectively, 90%, 95% and 99%. 
a See equation (9b).   40   41 
7  Conclusion 
This paper analyses the effects of loan market competition on bank interest rates on loans and 
deposits, measuring competition by a new approach, called the Boone indicator. Our results 
show that, in the euro area countries, bank interest rate spreads on mortgage loans, consumer 
loans and short-term loans to enterprises are significantly lower in more competitive markets. 
This result implies that bank loan rates tend to be lower under heavier competition, thus 
improving social welfare. Banks compensate for stronger loan market competition by lowering 
their deposit rates. Furthermore, evidence is found for all four loan categories that, in the long 
run, bank loan rates are closer in line with market rates where competition is higher. These 
results show that stronger loan market competition reduces bank loan rates while changes in 
market rates are transmitted more rapidly to bank rates. These findings underline that bank 
competition may have a substantial impact on the monetary policy transmission mechanism.  
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Appendix  The estimation of the Boone Indicator Model 
Description of the data used 
The Boone indicator model uses Bankscope data of banks from eight euro area countries during 
1992-2004.
28 This model is based on marginal costs which are derived from a translog cost 
function with output components and input prices. In order to exclude irrelevant and unreliable 
observations, banks are incorporated in our sample only, if they fulfilled the following 
conditions: total assets, loans, deposits, equity and other non-interest income should be positive; 
the deposits-to-assets ratio and loans-to-assets ratio should be less than, respectively, 0.98 and 
1; the income-to-assets ratio should be below 0.20; personnel expenses-to-assets and other 
expenses-to-assets ratios should be between 0.05% and 5%; and, finally, the equity-to-assets 
ratio should be between 0.01 and 0.50. As a result, our final data set totals 520 commercial 
banks, 1506 cooperative banks, 699 savings banks, 28 special governmental credit institutions 
(Landesbanken) and 62 real estate banks (see Table A.1). 
Table A.1  Number of banks by country and by type  
Country  Commercial 
banks 
Cooperative 
banks 
Real estate 
banks 
Savings banks  Specialized governmental 
credit institutions 
Total 
             
AT  52  54  10  65  0  181 
BE  24  6  0  5  0  35 
DE  130  867  44  501  28  1570 
ES  61  17  0  43  0  121 
FR  115  83  2  30  0  230 
IT  105  476  1  52  0  634 
NL  24  1  4  1  0  30 
PT  9  2  1  2  0  14 
             
Total  520  1506  62  699  28  2815 
 
Table A.2 provides a short description of the model variables. To grasp the relative magnitude 
of the key variables, such as costs, loans, security investment and other services, we present 
them as shares of corresponding balance sheet items. Total costs are defined as total expenses. 
They vary between 6.3% and 8.6% of total assets, whereas market shares in the loan market 
vary between 0.06% and 5.8%. Loans and securities are in the range of, respectively, 35%-60% 
and 4%-37% of total assets. One of the output components we distinguish is other services. For 
lack of direct observations, this variable is proxied by non-interest income. Non-interest income 
ranges from 12%-20% of total income. Wage rates are proxied as the ratio of personnel 
expenses and total assets, since for many banks the number of staff is not available. Wages vary 
across countries between 0.9% and 1.7% of total assets. The input price of capital is proxied by 
 
28 See also Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007), where a similar approach has been used.   50 
the ratio of other expenses and fixed assets. Finally, interest rates are proxied by dividing 
interest expenses by total funding and range from 3.2% to 5.9%. 
Table A.2  Mean values of key variables for various countries (in %) 
  Boone model      Translog cost function         
Country 
Code 
 Average 
loans market 
shares in % 
Total costs 
as % of total 
assets  
 Loans 
as % of 
total 
assets 
Securities 
as % of 
total assets 
Other 
services as 
% of total 
income 
Other 
expenses as 
% of fixed 
assets 
Wages as 
% of total 
assets 
Interest 
expenses as 
% of total 
funding 
                 
AT  0.87  6.34  56  22  20  229  1.4  3.2 
BE  2.27  6.49  35  37  16  594  1.0  4.5 
DE  0.06  6.44  60  22  12  227  1.5  3.7 
ES  0.98  6.63  58  14  16  167  1.5  4.1 
FR  0.41  7.42  54  4  20  537  1.5  4.8 
IT  0.22  6.67  53  26  16  261  1.7  3.5 
NL  3.02  6.59  54  15  13  340  0.9  5.4 
PT  5.83  8.62  52  8  18  191  1.3  5.9 
 
Estimation results for marginal costs 
We estimate a translog cost function for each separate country and take the first derivative of 
loans to derive the marginal costs of lending, see Equations (5) and (8), respectively.
29 Table 
A.3 shows the marginal costs of loans across countries and over time. Marginal costs decline 
over time, reflecting the significant decreases in funding rates during 1992-2004 and possibly 
also technological improvements. Germany, France and Spain have relatively high marginal 
costs compared to the Netherlands and Belgium. Apart from differences in funding rates, this 
may be explained also by lower efficiency in the former countries.
30  
 
29 See also Section 3.1 in Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007). 
30 Another explanation is lower population density in the former countries. Low population density may raise operating costs, 
as it makes retail distribution of banking services more costly.    51 
Table A.3  Marginal costs of loans across countries and over time (in %)  
  AT  BE  DE  ES  FR  IT  NL  PT 
                 
1992  10.3  7.1  10.2  15.9  13.8  13.2  9.2  21.3 
1993  9.4  6.9  9.4  17.2  13.4  12.0  8.1  18.8 
1994  7.1  6.4  9.2  14.3  11.9  12.2  7.4  16.6 
1995  7.3  5.8  8.9  15.4  11.7  11.8  7.1  15.4 
1996  7.1  5.2  8.5  14.3  10.9  11.3  6.3  13.4 
1997  6.1  4.6  7.4  11.7  10.9  9.7  6.4  12.3 
1998  6.0  3.6  7.1  11.1  11.2  7.5  7.4  9.4 
1999  5.5  3.2  6.4  8.8  10.0  6.7  6.4  6.1 
2000  6.1  3.3  7.1  9.9  11.2  6.7  6.5  6.3 
2001  6.1  3.1  7.3  9.6  11.7  6.6  6.4  5.9 
2002  5.7  3.1  7.1  7.8  10.7  6.1  5.7  5.2 
2003  5.5  2.7  6.4  5.9  8.9  5.3  4.9  5.3 
2004  5.2  2.5  6.0  4.8  7.9  4.9  4.6  5.5 
 
Estimation results for the Boone indicator  
Table A.4 shows the estimates of the Boone indicator across countries and over time (usually 
1994-2004, depending on the respective country). The results are based on the following model: 
ln msi,t = α + ∑t=1,..,T βt ln mci,t + ∑t=1,..,(T-1) γt dt + ui,t  (A.1) 
explaining loans market shares of bank i in year t (msi,t) by marginal costs (mci,t) and country 
dummies (dt). Note that the Boone indicator, βt, is time dependent. The estimations are carried 
out using the Generalized Moment Method (GMM) with as instrument variables the one-, two- 
or three-year lagged values of the explanatory variable, marginal costs, or average costs. To test 
on overidentification of the instruments, we apply the Hansen J-test for GMM (Hayashi, 2000). 
The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid as such, i.e. uncorrelated with the 
error term. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic is chi-squared with the number of degrees 
of freedom equal to the number of overidentification restrictions. A rejection would cast doubt 
on the validity of the instruments. Furthermore, the Anderson canonical correlation likelihood 
ratio is used to test for the relevance of excluded instrument variables (Hayashi, 2000). The null 
hypothesis of this test is that the matrix of reduced form coefficients has rank K-1, where K is 
the number of regressors, meaning that the equation is underidentified. Under the null 
hypothesis of underidentification, the statistic is chi-squared distributed with L-K+1 degrees of 
freedom, where L is the number of instruments (whether included in the equation or excluded). 
This statistic provides a measure of instrument relevance, and rejection of the null hypothesis 
indicates that the model is identified. We use kernel-based heteroskedastic and autocorrelation 
consistent (HAC) variance estimations. The bandwidth in the estimation is set at two periods 
and the Newey-West kernel is applied. Where the instruments are overidentified, 2SLS is used 
instead of GMM. For this 2SLS estimator, Sargan’s statistic is used instead of the Hansen J-test.   52 
Over the sample period, the Boone indicator for Belgium, Germany, and Italy are highly 
significant, except for one or two years, suggesting stronger loan market competition then 
elsewhere in the euro area.
31 The Dutch and Spanish loan markets take up an intermediate 
position with significant Boone indicators for at least a number of years. For France, the degree 
of competition declined over the years, where the reverse development is observed for Austra 
and Portugal. If, for each country, we had estimated only one beta for the full-sample period 
instead of annual ones (that is, βt = β for all t), we would have obtained significant values for all 
countries (except Portugal), reflecting a certain degree of competition in the whole area (see 
Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2007).  
Table A.5  The Boone indicator over time and across various countries
2)  
                              Germany
1)          France            Italy
1) 
  βt  Z-value  βt  Z-value  βt  Z-value 
             
1993          - 5.90  - 1.18 
1994          - 7.25**  - 3.24 
1995  - 4.47  - 1.40  - 1.28**  - 3.36  - 4.51**  - 3.53 
1996  - 7.09**  - 2.92  - 1.28**  - 3.56  - 5.58**  - 3.98 
1997  - 4.64**  - 3.41  - 1.11**  - 3.55  - 5.89**  - 4.08 
1998  - 5.10**  - 3.97  - 0.79*  - 1.99  - 4.60**  - 6.08 
1999  - 2.60**  - 4.04  - 0.7*  - 2.30  - 4.05**  - 4.39 
2000  - 2.50**  - 4.60  - 0.46  - 1.34  - 3.32**  - 4.39 
2001  - 3.31**  - 7.02  - 0.68  - 1.67  - 2.66**  - 3.62 
2002  - 4.53**  - 4.71  - 0.40  - 0.78  - 1.59  - 1.82 
2003  - 2.73**  - 5.62  0.27  0.39  - 2.42**  - 3.69 
2004  - 2.66((  - 4.15  0.10  0.12  - 1.81**  - 2.79 
F-test  10.70    5.01  13.23   
Anderson canon corr. LR-test  185.20    1023.66  300.34   
Hansen J-test (p-value)  0.00     19.69 (0.48)  0.00    
Number of observations  14 534    918  4918   
           
Notes: Asterisks indicate 95% (*) and 99% (**) levels of confidence. Coefficients of time dummies have not been shown.  
1 2SLS is used and the equation is exactly identified, so that the Hansen J-test is 0.00.  
2 Equation (A.1) is estimated with the GMM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 Most likely, the favourable result for Germany hinges in part on the special structure of its banking system, being built on 
three pillars, i.e. the commercial banks, the publicly-owned savings banks and the cooperative banks (see Hackethal, 2004).   53 
Table A.5  The Boone indicator over time and across various countries
2) (continued). 
                         Spain
1)                  Netherlands                 Belgium 
  βt  Z-value  βt  Z-value  βt  Z-value 
             
1993  - 4.21*  - 2.49         
1994  - 4.80*  - 2.28  - 1.92  - 1.42     
1995  - 5.20  - 1.92  - 4.42*  - 2.42  - 1.48  - 1.59 
1996  - 9.61  - 0.67  - 2.09**  - 2.58  - 1.74**  - 2.93 
1997  - 4.36  - 1.78  - 3.57  - 1.70  - 2.02((  - 3.78 
1998  - 5.40  - 0.86  1.04  0.38  - 1.98**  - 3.19 
1999  - 5.46*  - 2.21  - 1.44  - 0.85  - 2.62**  - 4.65 
2000  - 3.44  - 1.93  - 3.26**  - 3.00  - 3.41**  - 6.10 
2001  - 4.38**  - 2.55  - 3.91**  - 4.71  - 3.00**  - 4.51 
2002  - 3.88*  - 2.09  - 2.45*  - 2.44  - 3.42**  - 4.34 
2003  - 3.42  - 1.20  - 2.22  - 1.80  - 2.79**  - 3.18 
2004  - 2.69**  - 5.62  - 3.09**  - 2.85  - 3.12**  - 4.02 
F-test      3.33    3.90    6.35   
Anderson canon corr. LR-test  38.78    31.71    178.10   
Hansen J-test (p-value)  0.00    20.5 (0.039)    8.34 (0.60)   
Number of observations  1015    241    269   
           
                         Austria            Portugal   
  βt  Z-value  βt  Z-value     
             
1994  11.2  1.01  0.05  0.05     
1995  - 4.03  - 0.94  1.57  0.91     
1996  - 2.31*  - 1.93  0.09  0.16     
1997  4.25  0.93  - 0.04  - 0.08     
1998  - 0.91  - 0.52  - 0.55  - 0.76     
1999  - 2.98  - 0.73  - 1.51  - 1.40     
2000  - 2.31  - 0.50  - 2.43**  - 4.03     
2001  - 0.96  - 1.30  - 1.92**  - 3.77     
2002  - 1.49*  - 1.97  - 2.16**  - 7.33     
2003  - 1.26**  - 3.52  - 1.74*  - 2.05     
2004  - 2.99**  - 2.23  - 1.53  - 1.69     
F-test  2.21    3.94       
Anderson canon corr. LR-test  28.89    77.92       
Hansen J-test, (p-value)  9.308 (0.59)    11.71 (0.38)       
Number of observations  988    134       
             
Notes: Asterisks indicate 95% (*) and 99% (**) levels of confidence. Coefficients of time dummies have not been shown.  
1 2SLS is used and the equation is exactly identified, so that the Hansen J-test is 0.00.  
2 Equation (A.1) is estimated with the GMM. 
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